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Abstract
This article develops a general method to solve dynamic models of interactions between multiple
strategic agents that extends the static model studied previously by the authors. It describes a gen-
eral model of several interacting agents, their domination relations as well as a graph encoding their
information pattern. It provides a general resolution algorithm and discusses the dynamics around the
equilibrium.
Our model explains apparent irrational or biased individual behaviors as the result of the actions of
several goal-specic rational agents. Our main example is a three-agent model describing the conscious,
the unconscious, and the body. We show that, when the unconscious strategically dominates, the
equilibrium is unconscious-optimal, but body and conscious-suboptimal. In particular, the unconscious
may drive the conscious towards its goals by blurring physical needs.
Our results allow for a precise account of agentstime rate preference. Myopic behavior among agents
leads to oscillatory dynamics : each agent, reacting sequentially, adjusts its action to undo other agents
previous actions. This describes cyclical and apparently inconsistent or irrational behaviors in the dual
agent. This cyclicality is present when agents are forward-looking, but can be dampened depending on
the conscious sensitivity to other agentsactions.
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Introduction
Irrational actions are usually attributed to an unconscious agent whose actions would, at times, supersede
those of the conscious. Economically, this unconscious activity should therefore be modeled as the action of a
single, permanent and fully rational agent acting alongside the conscious. Yet this obvious path to modeling
the unconscious as an economic agent has systematically been disregarded by the literature, for a single and
no less obvious reason : two rational agents sharing the same information and acting through one individual
should have two perfectly identical actions, boiling down to a single rational action. No irrationality would
thus emerge from such a setup.
Yet to understand the unconscious is to suppose it to be both rational and permanent. To be understood,
the unconscious must be supposed to be rational. It must also be permanent, in the sense that it should
not be possible to dismissit at will. Besides, unconscious and conscious must have identical information.
Consequently, a di¤erence in actions between these two rational agents can only emerge from di¤erent grids
of lecture, i.e. from the way they process information.
The question therefore is not to know whether we should model the unconscious as a permanent and
rational agent, but to infer how its interpretation of the reality can di¤er from the consciousone.
This approach has been developed in [L], who dubbed the resulting agent, i.e. the combination of two
- conscious and unconscious - fully economically rational agents, the dual agent. In this setup, irrational
behaviors do not arise from the existence of an irrational unconscious, but from the mere fact that these two
agents evaluate events through di¤erent grids, though acting through one single body.
True, economic models of inconsistent behaviors have already considered the person as a set of interacting
sub-agents1 . They use dual or multiple selves acting synchronicallyand/or diachronicallyon a similar
set of information to achieve di¤erent objectives2 .
The Picoeconomic framework, in particular, represents this situation as a bargaining game between several
selves3 . To Picoeconomics, the role of the unconscious - inasmuch as such a notion can be attributed to the
sub-structures they consider - usually appears as a mere unknown random modication on the short-term
utility.
We believe, on the contrary, that a pattern of behavior displays a certain persistency and must, as a
consequence, be active at all stages of the decision and action processes. We see the human psyche as several
agents in complex, simultaneous, and possibly strategic, interactions.
The notion of dual agent proposed by [L] must specically be distinguished from the dual selfconsidered
by Fudenberg and Levin [FL]. In their setup, long-run and short-run sub-structures model behaviors of self-
control. The long-run self imposes costs on short-run selves and control their behaviors, so that an agent will
successively identify to several selves, each disappearing in turn. Whereas [FL] and Picoeconomics model
unknown mechanisms inducing changes in the agents utility, our goal is to describe these very processes,
along with the reason of their incoherence and inconsistency. Only by describing some unconscious rational
behavior can we hope to achieve this.
Two subsequent papers [GL, GLW] formalized and generalized the dual agent approach of [L]. They
model individual behavior as a system of interacting rational structures, or rational agents, embedded in a
network of interactions. The system is driven initially by external signals that activate some of the structures,
that react by sending signals throughout the network, in turn activating other structures, and so on4 .
[GL] presented a dynamic model in which one agent dominates the others. We showed that such a
dynamic model can, depending on its parameters, present stable or unstable oscillations, as well as periodic
cycles. More importantly, we showed that the action of the dominating agent induced apparent change of
objective, or switch in preferences, of other agents. This led us to introduce the notion of e¤ective utility,
and propose an alternative interpretation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
However, this model did not take into account more complex situations, such as competition among
several dominant agents, or patterns such as tripartite games, where a structure is used to manipulate
another one. In a given individual, conscious objectives entailing the body may encounter unconscious
resistance. In social relations, one group may manipulate an other group against a third one.
1See [Ross].
2For example cases of procrastination such as Akerlofs [Akerlof].
3 [Ainslie92]. see [Ross] and references therein for an account.
4See [GL] for a precise account.
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To model such congurations, [GLW] designed a general pattern of static and strategic interactions
among several agents. A graph describing the agents strategic relations and their interactions command
the resolution of the model. We used this pattern to solve a three-agents model, respectively a body, a
conscious and an unconscious. These three terms are only generic terms and should be taken as archetype
of behaviors, where the unconscious has a strategic advantage over the conscious and the body, and the
conscious dominates the body. We show that, depending on the parameters of the model, the unconscious
can twist the consciousaction via the manipulation of the bodys objectives. It may result in an unstable
pattern, anorexic- or bulimic-like, the bodys action being used to deter or reinforce, given the unconscious
objective, the task of the conscious agent.
[GLW] presented a static one-period model, that encompassed, as a particular case, the long-run self
and short-run selvesmodel, as well as the successive-selvesmodel of Pico-economics [FL]. Successive
agentsactions induced a dynamic aspect which allowed to anticipate long-term patterns, such as apparently
irrational changes of goals or cyclic behavior. However, no precise study of their dynamic interactions was
provided.
This paper lls this gap by generalizing the [GLW] setup in a dynamic framework, replacing static utilities
by intertemporal ones. The dynamic of the system is induced by a one-period delay between one agents
action and its perception by the other agents. As in [GLW], the utilities are quadratic to model interactions
between agents around an initial perturbed equilibrium, and the frame of interactions between agents is
described by a graph whose vertices are the agents and the oriented arrows represent their pairwise relative
strategic advantages.
We present a method of resolution for this general dynamic model with an arbitrary number of agents.
Each agents optimization is performed in the order given by the domination graph. The solutions are
obtained recursively as power series in the discount rates, by means of usual linear algebra techniques.
Contrary to [GLW], since utilities and actions are forward-looking, each agents pattern of information is
presented. We assume that each agent knows the domination relations between the structures he strategically
dominates in the graph. It also knows the parameters characterizing the agents interactions, but ignores
the inuence of the structures he does not dominate. To us, this pattern of information is both realistic
and general enough to describe the dynamic version of [GLW]: some plans forecasted by a rst agent,
and involving some substructures, may be impaired by the actions of competing agents, leading to a biased
equilibrium from the rst agent perspective. If this rst agent is misleadingly identied with the individual
as a whole, one can conclude to an irrational behavior, through a bias, or a change of utility function, as
already spotted in [GL] for two agents interacting dynamically.
This resolution method is then used to solve explicitly a dynamic version of our basic archetypal three-
agent model. Despite some di¤erences, the long-run equilibrium is similar to the static solution, and the
interpretations of [GLW] are preserved. The dynamic model allows a full interpretation of the stability and
dynamics of the solution : if the unconscious strategically dominates, the equilibrium will be unconscious-
optimal, but both body- and conscious-suboptimal.
Our result allow for a precise account of agentstime rate preference. Myopic behavior among agents
leads to an oscillatory dynamics. Each agent, reacting sequentially, adjusts its present action to other
agentsprevious actions, to undo their work. This describes cyclical and apparently inconsistent or irrational
behaviors in the dual agent.
This cyclicality is present when agents are forward-looking. However, it may be dampened depending
on the conscious sensitivity to other agents actions. If this sensistivity is mild, a stable but conscious-
suboptimal equilibrium will be reached. On the contrary, if the conscious agent is highly sensitive to other
agentsactions, unstability will appear. A divergent and spiraling behavior will prove costly for the dual
agents welfare.
These results allow to ascribe inconsistent preferences and apparent switches in behaviors to the unknown
action of some strategic structures behind conscious choices. They describe the nature of the structures
utilities as well as their interactions, and give a hint about internal sub-structurescapacity to plan their
actions.
The paper is organized in four sections. The rst section presents, develops and interprets the results of
a dynamic version of the three-agent static model of [GLW]. The second section develops a general dynamic
model of several interacting structures. It provides a resolution method to nd the equilibrium and the
uctuations around it. The third section applies this formalism to give a detailed solution of section one
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three-agent model. The last section concludes.
1 A dynamic three-agent model
This section presents a dynamic version of the static three interacting agent model developed and solved
in [GLW]. For the sake of clarity, we will give a detailed reminder of the static model and briey recall its
solutions.
[GLW] described the apparent irrational behavior of an individual as resulting from the combined actions
of three interacting sub-structures - or agents - within the psyche of that individual.
These three interacting agents typically represent two mental processes - one conscious and one un-
conscious, along with a third - physical - process, the body. This setting may alternately apply to every
conguration in which a global entityor instancemay be divided into several interacting sub-structures
having di¤erent goals and information.
Suppose an individual whose conscious wants to perform a specic task. However an other independent
agent, his unconscious, has other goals and hence considers this task as suboptimal. Moreover, a third agent,
the body, has specic needs that have to be satised. We assume that the unconscious partly inuences
both the body and the conscious by sending signals, such as discomforts or strains.
Consider, as an example, a student which experiences di¢ culties in concentrating. Each time he starts
studying, he is suddenly overwhelmed by sleepiness, boredom or compulsions, such as smoking or eating.
Being both rested and fed, these cannot possibly obey objective physical needs.
In our perspective, these bouts of compulsion encapsulate the action of an other, independant agent, the
unconscious, whose priorities and goals di¤er from those of the conscious, mainly because its interpretation
grid di¤ers from the one of the conscious5 . The conscious actions are read and interpreted by the unconscious
according to a specic and completely di¤erent grid. To him, these conscious actions are suboptimal or
potentially dangerous, and he will react accordingly by deterring the conscious actions.
In the case of our student, we can infer that his unconscious perceives learning as being harmful, and
reacts by thwarting the conscious action. Ultimately, the individual visible behavior will merely be the
result of the three agents interactions, which, in a dynamical perspective, may result in some incoherent
patterns, such as an inconsistency in an agents goal.
1.1 Reminder: the static three-agent model
The body, denoted Agent B, is modeled as an automaton whose sole action, n; signals either a physical need,
when n > 0; or a satiety signal, when n < 0.
The conscious, Agent C, has two possible actions. It can perform a task w, whose optimum is arbitrarily
normalized to 0, or react to Agent Bs signal by satisfying its need with a second action f (feeding). Both
actions being exclusive and complementary, the agents time period will be optimally divided between the
two actions, under the constraint :
w + f = 1
To the unconscious, denoted Agent U, the variable w0s optimum is not zero, but an other value, denoted
~w. To reach its goal, the unconscious will weigh on the consciousoptimization problem by means of three
strains6 . Two of them, sw and sf , directly a¤ect the consciousactions w and f . The third one, sn inuences
the body by modifying its need, n. Neither Agent C nor Agent B are aware of the presence, goals, and
actions of Agent U.
5See [GL] for more details.
6Actually, this would look like changing the consciousoptimum. See [GL].
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The agent utilities We denote the utilities of the three agents body, unconscious and conscious, respec-
tively UB, UU, UC, and set:
UB =  1
2
(n+ f)
2   nsn (1)
UU =  1
2



f   ~f
2
+  (w   ~w)2 + s2n + s2f + s2w

UC =  1
2

(w   w0)2 + n2

  nw   sf

f   ~f

  sw (w   ~w) :
under the constraint: w+ f = 1:The utilities are quadratic and normalized so that the terms containing the
square control variables have coe¢ cients of   12 or 0.7
The utility of the body Being an automaton, the body has no specic goals, and its utility function
UB merely describes its reaction to other agentsactions8 . Without any interaction with the unconscious U,
the body would, in rst approximation, react linearly to the conscious C action, the feeding :
 1
2
(n+ f)
2
The unconscious inuences the body by perturbating its signal
 nsn
Whereas in the absence of the unconscious, the bodys optimum would be reached for
n =  f = 0
This result being suboptimal for Agent U, he will tilt the equilibrium toward its own goal ~f .
Recall that the task performed by the conscious w should not be viewed as physically demanding, and
should have no impact on the bodys response n. Indeed, we do not seek to model the physical e¤ort per
se. We rather seek to understand how the unconscious can manipulate an existing equilibrium between the
body and the conscious, i.e. to study the use of the body signal by the unconscious to reach its own goals
By convention, we will impose the parameter  to be positive, so that a positive strain will respond to a
positive feeding.
The utility of the conscious In the absence of both the unconscious and the body, the conscious
utility would be :
 1
2
(w   w0)2
so that in the absence of any constraint set on w, Agent C would optimally choose w = w0 > 0.
Body needs a¤ect Agent C through
 1
2
n2   nw
so that the higher is the need, the more painful is the task.
7Note that, in order to use later dynamic models standard notations, we modied some of the notations of [GLW].
8 In this setting, endowing the body with specic goals would have allowed it to manipulate the conscious, which was not
our purpose here.
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However in the absence of Agent U, Agent C will still be able to set w = 0 by adjusting the feeding to
the anticipated need.
The need is in itself, painful, since:
 1
2
n2
so we set
 > 0
The above assumption is a direct consequence of dismissing any cost to the feeding f . In this, we depart
from standard models in which some costs, or constraints, are imposed to an agents tasks.Without Agent
U, Agent B and the variable f could be discarded from Agent Cs equilibrium. Once Agent U is included in
the system, it indirectly manipulates Agent C through Agent B by assigning a strategic role to f . However
we impose a binding constraint on the feeding by considering f and w as complementary activities within a
given time span, and set f +w = 1, as previously mentioned. The unconscious imposes its goals ~f and ~w on
the conscious through perturbation terms:
 sf (f   ~f)  sw (w   ~w)
driving Agent Cs actions away from 0 and towards ~f and ~w.
Some additional technical conditions on UC will prove convenient. We will ensure that UC is negative
denite, and allow the existence of an optimum by setting :
   2 > 0
Excessive working combined with unsatised needs should induce a loss in utility for Agent C, which is
implemented by imposing:
 > 0 for n > 0 and w > 0
.
The utility of the unconscious An agent, be it the conscious or the unconscious, builds its interpre-
tation of a situation - and thus its utility function - through its own, specic, grid of lecture9 .
Agent U and Agent C will therefore have two completely di¤erent interpretations of a single situation. And
while Agent C will consider f and w as optimal, Agent U will consider other levels of the consciousactivity,
~f , ~w as optimal.
Agent Us goals with respect to Agent Cs activity are:
 1
2
(f   ~f)2   1
2
(w   ~w)2
To insure that UU can have an optimum, we further impose  and  to be positive.
Since the three agents are one single individual, a strain inicted by one agent ends up being painful for all
of them. The cost incurred by the other agents by the strains imposed on them are :
 1
2
 
s2n + s
2
f + s
2
w

9See [GL] for further details.
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Additional constraints Some additional constraints on the coe¢ cients and variables are required to
have a realistic model.
Since Agent U inicts a pain if his goals are not reached, sf et sw should be assumed positive. How-
ever such a condition does not exist for sn. Agent U has no optimum value for n. For the unconscious, sn
is a mere adjustment variable, and can be alternately a pain or a reward to the body.
To model the pain imposed by the unconscious over the conscious, the terms  sf (f   ~f) and  sw (w   ~w)
should be negative. The equilibrium values of f and w will respectively lie between 0 and ~f and between 0
and ~w. We therefore impose ~f and  (respectively ~w and ) to have opposite signs.
The hierarchy of strategical advantages. In our setting, some agents are assumed to have a strategical
advantage over others.
Agent U is strategically dominant. It has a strategic advantage over both Agent C and Agent B. Agent C
is strategic only with respect to Agent B, and Agent B has no strategic advantage. The dynamic model will
be solved in the order of this hierarchy of strategical advantages 10 .
We rst implement the time binding constraint w + f = 1 for Agent Cs actions and replace directly
f = 1  w in the utility functions:
UB =  1
2
(n+ 1  w)2 nsn
UU =  1
2
(1  w   ~f)2 1
2
(w   ~w)2 1
2
s2n 
1
2
s2n 
1
2
s2w
UC =  1
2
(w   w0)2   1
2
n2   nw   sf (1  w   ~f)  sw(w   ~w)
Recall that Agent U inuences Agent C in two competing ways. Directly, through the strains sf and sw,
and indirectly, by triggering a need in Agent B through sn. The relative strengths of the parameters will
determine Agent Us preferred channel of action, and lead to di¤erent behaviors in the individual.
Hidden and patent manipulation Two types of unconscious manipulation emerge.
In the rst type of manipulation, the unconscious does not mask its action. The individual is driven away
from w0s conscious optimum, and physical needs n may consequently be under or over-satised, depending
on the unconsciousoptimum. However, the individual will be aware of this disequilibrium. If physical needs
are under-satised, the situation may not be sustainable in the long run. If they are over-satised, the
situation could be more sustainable in the longer run.
In the second type of manipulation, the individual is still driven away from w0s conscious optimum, but the
unconscious masks the disequilibrium by manipulating physical needs. For instance, the unconscious may
sustain an hyperactivity phase by reducing physical needs, so that the individual will not be conscious of
the disequilibrium. This situation may be more sustainable, but may lead to a breakdown in the longer run.
1.2 Dynamic model
This static model is made dynamic when we turn the above static utilities into intertemporal ones, by
summing weighted expectations of future utilities. The delay between consecutive actions will induce some
adaptations. More importantly, the information setup will have to be precisely described.
10For a complete resolution of the model and the discussion of its solutions, see [GLW].
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1.2.1 Presentation of the three-agent model.
Each agent optimizes, given its own information set, a forward-looking intertemporal utility function of the
form:
(Vit) =
X
m0
mi EiUi(t+m)
where the discount factor i is Agent i rate of preference for the present, and Ei its expectation operator at
time t. Agent i forecasts of future quantities will be computed given its information set.
The information setup follows the order of domination between the agents11 . Agent B is the less informed of
all agents, and is only aware of the strains hes a¤ected by. Agent C is aware of its own inuence on Agent
B, as well as the strains Agent U puts on him. Agent U is the most informed of all agents, and knows the
utilities function of both Agent C and Agent B.
The instantaneous utility Ui(t + m) at time t + m reproduces the static utility of section 1, but introduces
a time dependency in each action variable. Moreover, we assume that each action taken at time t by any
agent will only be perceived by the other agents at time t+ 1.
Taking into account all of the above conditions, the utilities take the following dynamic form:
UB (t) =  1
2
(n (t) + 1  w (t  1))2   n (t) sn (t  1) (2)
UU (t) =  1
2


1  w (t  1)  ef2   1
2
 (w (t  1)  ew)2   1
2
s2n (t) 
1
2
s2f (t) 
1
2
s2w (t)
UC (t) =  1
2
(w (t)  w0)2   1
2
n2 (t  1)  vn (t  1)w (t)  sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ef  sw (t  1)  w (t)  et
Note that in each of the above utilities, the agent own action variables appear with a time index t, as expected
for utility at time t, whereas other agentsaction variables appear with a time index t  1.
The full resolution of the dynamical model will be presented in the general resolution method. We therefore
postpone the description of the information setup and directly present the results of the dynamic three-agent
model.
1.2.2 Solution of the dynamic model
Under the assumption that the discount rates i are identical and equal to a given , all computations done,
we obtain the following result.
The long-run equilibrium is given by the action variables values :
11For the sake of clarity we do not present here the information set up. It will be fully described in the resolution of the
general model.
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n = 2

K   w0
 + 1
   
2 + 2K
 + 1
  ( ~w   w0) +  1   ~f + w0

w = 2

K   w0
 + 1
+ 
22   2K
 + 1
  ( ~w   w0) +  1   ~f + w0

+ w0
sn = 
3
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


sw =  2 (1 )
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


sf = 
2 (1 )
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


where we set:
 =    2; K = 2 + 2; and  = + :
1.2.3 Discussion
The results are very similar to the static case12 . Two di¤erent general patterns appear for the equilibrium.
By impleting a stress positively correlated to its goal on the need, Agent U can drive Agent Cs task toward
its own objectives.
However, the reaction of Agent B is ambiguous, and depends on the relative strength of the parameters.
Two di¤erent regimes appear in the dynamic setting.
Under the condition :
K >
w0 + 
2
1  2
both w and n are positively correlated to Agent Us goal.
To explain this result, recall that Agent U has two channels of actions on Agent C.
The direct channel acts through the strains sf and sw. Its e¢ ciency on Cs utility is measured by the
coe¢ cients  and  and thus by
K = 2 + 2
The indirect channel consists in inuencing the needs of Agent B, that will in turn impact Agent Cs action.
Its strength is measured by , the sensitivity of Agent Bs to the strain sn
The above inequality therefore compares the relative strengths of the direct channel versus the indirect
channel. If the direct channel is more e¢ cient, it is optimal for U to drive Agent Cs activity by acting on
the direct strains sw and sf . Higher feeding will satisfy the higher needs induced by a higher activity for
Agent C.
On the other hand, under the condition :
K <
w0 + 
2
1  2
the indirect channel is relatively more e¢ cient than the direct one. Agent U will favor it and impose a strain
on Agent B. This strain will induce a decrease of Agent Bs needs, and indirectly allow Agent C to increase
12See [GLW] for comparison.
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its task at a comparatively lower feeding cost than the direct channel. As a result, the equilibrium values
w and n will respectively be positively and negatively correlated to Agent Us goal.
The di¤erence in patterns of behavior appears clearly in the feeding of the individual. Alongside a normal
pattern, where higher feeding is associated with increased work, we nd an anorexicpattern, where reduced
feeding is associated with increased activity.
Fluctuations around the equilibrium. To fully understand the dynamics and the stability of the system,
we need to compute the uctuations around the equilibrium. The utility functions being quadratic, these
uctuations are given by a linear rst order dynamic system of the kind
[Y (t)] = M [Y (t  1)] +
h
W^ (t)
i
(3)
where [Y (t)] is the - ve dimensions13 - vector of action variable uctuations around their equilibrium.
[Y (t)] =
0BBBB@
n(t)  n
w(t)  w
sn(t)  sn
sw(t)  st
sf (t)  sf
1CCCCA
The coe¢ cients of the matrix M depend on the parameters of the model and
h
W^ (t)
i
is a - ve components
- vector of random perturbation at time t14 .
The e¤ects of an initial shock on the system will be computed using Equation (3). Assume a system in
equilibrium with [Y (0)] = 0 at time t = 0, and consider a single initial shock
h
W^ (t)
i
such that W^ (0) 6= 0
and W^ (t) = 0 for t > 0. The solution of Equation (3), given these assumptions, is :
[Y (m)] = MmW^ (0)
Stability of the system The stability of the system will depend on the nature of the eigenvalues of
M . Section 3 will show that 0 is a triple eigenvalue, and that the two other eigenvalues are the complex
conjugates:
 = i
p


1  1
2
2 (K + ) +
1
2
3
  22 + 2K+O(4) (4)
at the third order approximation in .
 being imaginary, the system is oscillating, which is a direct consequence of our model, where non collab-
orating agents alternately try to stir the equilibrium towards their respective goals by detering other agents
actions.
The system will be stable if the modulus jj of  is lower than 1, stably cyclical if it is equal to 1,
and unstable if jj>1.
As a benchmark case, let us consider the eigenvalues for  = 0, where all agents only care about the
present. In this case, the eigenvalues are ip, and the dynamic will be diverging if  > 1, cyclic if  = 1,
and converging if  < 1.
The interpretation is the following: Agent B reacts to Agent Cs feeding in a 1 to 1 ratio, and Agent
13The number of action variables.
14The explicit forms are given in Section 3.
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Cs w reacts to Agent Bs need with a ratio , so that both agentsactions will be multiplied by  over a
two-period horizon. Agent Us action paying only over a two to three-periods horizon, it is irrelevant when
 = 0, and prevents Agent U from taking it. The myopic behavior among agents leads to an oscillatory
dynamics. Each agent, reacting sequentially, adjusts its action to undo other agentsprevious actions. This
describes cyclical and apparently inconsistent or irrational behaviors in the dual agent. These oscillations
may diverge or fade away with time, depending on the value of .
When  is di¤erent from 0 but relatively small, the system is still oscillatory. However, the time concern
 will have an ambiguous e¤ect on its stability. Decomposing Equation (4) in its second and third order
contributions will illustrate this point.
First, note that because of the delay in the actionsimpact, their feedback on their originating agent will
be seen in two periods - if the action follows the direct channel - or possibly three periods, if it follows the
indirect channel15 .
At the second order in , Equation (4) shows that the agents concern about the future has a stabiliz-
ing e¤ect and reduces the magnitude of the oscillations. At this order, the eigenvaluesmodule is
jj =
p

1  122 (K + )
+O(3)
which is lower than
p
.
The stabilization e¤ect appears at the two-period horizon (the second-order in ), since this horizon prevents
Agent U to use the indirect channel. The stabilization is obtained by Agent Us direct action on Agent C,
and by Agent Cs direct action on Agent B.
At the three-period horizon (the third order in ), the stability is more ambiguous. Agent U can use the
indirect channel to stabilize the system around an equilibrium to its own advantage. On the other hand,
Agent C can react to Agent Us action, by destabilizing Agent Us optimum. Because of theses antinomic
actions, the stability of the system depends on the relative strength of the parameters.
An overall interpretation of the system can be reached by combining these two di¤erent horizon e¤ects, and
negliging higer order contributions. The time concern total correction to the eigenvalues is :
 1
2
2 (K + ) +
1
2
3
  22 + 2K
Recall that  measures the overall concern of the unconscious for the conscious activity, K the sensitivity
of the conscious agent to the strains imposed by the unconscious, and  the relative strength of the direct
e¤ect of the need on the conscious agent compared to its e¤ect via the e¤ort term  nw of UC in equations
1.
The above quantity is positive if
K (2   1)  22 > 0
and
 >

K (2   1)  22  threshold
Since  > 0, if  and K are large enough, i.e. if they are such that :
2   1 > 0
and
K (2   1)  22 > 0
15 i.e. from Agent U to Agent B, then from Agent B to Agent C and ultimately from Agent C to Agent U.
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there exists a threshhold threshold such that when  > threshold ; the instability of the system is increased
by the forward-looking nature of its agents, and its stability reinforced otherwise. As a result, given a
time rate preference , if the conscious is highly sensitive to the other agentsactions, and if conscious and
unconscious goals are strongly divergent, an instability in the system may arise. The system is driven away
from its equilibrium, leading to an explosive and suboptimal pattern for all agents.
Moreover, the higher the time concern , the lower the sensitivity  can be to make the unstability case
arise. In other words, the more the system is forward looking, the more can we expect some unstability.
These results provide a pattern of the nature of structuresutilities as well as their interactions, and give
a hint about internal sub-structurescapacity to plan their actions. Inconsistent preferences and apparent
switches in behaviors can be ascribed to the unknown action of some strategic structures behind conscious
choices. The systems cyclicality, the striking di¤erences emerging between dynamic patterns of behaviors of
forward and non-forward looking structures, may, through empirical observations, support forward-looking
decisions in hidden partial processes, and give a better understanding of the sequence of mental processes.
2 A general model of several interacting structures
We now present and solve the general dynamic model of several interacting structures that encompasses the
three-agents example presented above. We will rst briey recall the general static formalism of [GLW], on
which the dynamic version will be developed.
2.1 Static several interacting agents.
This static version introduces the various agentsutility functions and the domination graph that commands
the resolution algorithm.
Strategic relations between agents The agents strategic relations dene the model setup. These
relations are described by an oriented graph   whose vertices are labelled by the agents involved.
If Agent i has a strategic advantage over Agent j; we draw an oriented edge from i to j and write i! j.
If there exists an oriented path from i to j, we write the relation i j, and state that Agent i dominates
directly or indirectly Agent j or, equivalently, that Agent j is subordinated to Agent i. If there is no oriented
path from i to j, we write j 6 i; where it is always understood that i 6= j. In the following, we merely
consider connected graphs without loops.
Under these conventions, the situation is modeled by an oriented graph whith vertices labelled after B;C;
and U , and whose edges orientation summarize the agentsstrategic advantages
C ! B; U ! B; U ! C
Matricial formalism The utilities will be described by the following matricial formalism. Each agents
actions is described by a vector of actions, or control variables. The size of the vector is determined by the
number of di¤erent actions it can take. The utilities being quadratic, matrices may be associated with them.
Let Xi 2 Rni be Agent is vector of control variables, and ~X(i)j 2 Rni the vector of goals associated
with the variables Xj ; as expected by agent i. We normalize ~X
(i)
j to 0, so that Agent i wishes to achieve
Xi = 0 and Xj = ~X
(i)
j .
Agent i0s utility is given by:
Ui =  1
2
tXiA
(i)
ii Xi  
1
2
X
ji
t

Xj   ~X(i)j

A
(i)
jj

Xj   ~X(i)j

 
X
ji
tXiA
(i)
ij Xj  
X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj   tXiPi
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In the absence of any interaction, Agent i0s utility is given by the term
 1
2
tXiA
(i)
ii Xi
The variables Xi are normalized so that A
(i)
ii is a fi  ni diagonal matrix whose coe¢ cients are 1 or 0.
If Agent i0s subordinate agents actions Xj depart from ~X
(i)
j , Agent i
0s will experience a loss of utility
of the form : X
ji
t

Xj   ~X(i)j

A
(i)
jj

Xj   ~X(i)j

The fj  nj matrix A(i)jj of parameters is of course symmetric.
The impact of Agent j0s action on Agent is utility isX
ji
tXiA
(i)
ij Xj  
X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj
where j  i can be seen as the impact of Agent j0s action on Agent i. In our model, Agent j does not
know the agents to whom he is subordinated, and processes their signals as external ones. The second term
models the strain imposed on Agent i by Agent j to achieve its own objectives for Xi.
Remark 1 Since the linear term in Xj disappears during the resolution,X
j 6i
tXiA
(i)
ij Xj
is equivalent to X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj
Notation 2 By convention, for the ni  nj parameters matrices A(i)ij , we will write tA(i)ij = A(i)ji .
The last term tXiPi models the change in utility caused by external perturbations summarized by the
vector Pi 2 Rni . For instance, the utilities of our three-agent model can be rewritten in the matricial
formalism as:
UB =  1
2
tXBXB   tXBA(B)BUXU   tXBA(B)BCXC  
1
2
tXCA
(B)
CCXC + (
tXC   tXB)EB
UU =  1
2
tXUA
(U)
UUXU  
1
2
t

XC   ~X(U)C

A
(U)
CC

XC   ~X(U)C

UC =  1
2
tXCA
(C)
CCXC  
1
2
t

XB   ~X(C)B

A
(C)
BB

XB   ~X(C)B

  tXCA(C)CBXB   tXUA(C)UCXC   tXU A(C)UC XC
where the control variables for the agents are concatenated in the following vectors:
XB =
 
n

; XU =
0@snst
sf
1A ; XC =  w   w0 :
where the left upper-script t(  ) denotes the usual transposition of matrices. The goals of Agent U are
condensed in the vector :
~X
(U)
C =

( ~w w0)+(1 ( ~f+w0))
+

and those of Agent C are described by:
~X
(C)
B =
  w0


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All others goals are normalized to 0 . We also set :
XC =
   ( ~w   w0)
1 

~f + w0
!
The utilities quadratic relations are commanded by the parameters matrices :
A
(B)
BU =
 
 0 0

; A
(B)
BC =
  1 ; A(U)CC = ()
A
(C)
CC =
 
1

; A
(C)
BB =
 


; A
(C)
CB =
 


A
(B)
CC = (1) ; EB =
 
1

;
A
(U)
UU =
0@1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
1A ; A(C)UC =
0@ 0
 
1A ; A(C)UC =
0@0 0 0
0 
1A
By convention, we set A(i)ji =
t

A
(i)
ij

.
Moreover, since Agent B is dominated by both Agent C and Agent U, and Agent C is dominated by Agent
U, the following matricial utilities will lead to the same equilibrium as UB; UU; UC.
U 0B =  
1
2
tXBXB   tXBA(B)BUXU   tXBA(B)BCXC  
1
2
tXCA
(B)
CCXC  tXBEB
U 0U =  
1
2
tXUA
(U)
UUXU  
1
2
t

XC   ~X(U)C

A
(U)
CC

XC   ~X(U)C

U 0C =  
1
2
tXCA
(C)
CCXC  
1
2
t

XB   ~X(C)B

A
(C)
BB

XB   ~X(C)B

  tXCA(C)CBXB   tXUA(C)UCXC
2.2 Presentation of the dynamic version
This section describes the general model for dynamics interacting structures.We adapt the matricial static
utilities to a dynamic context, and assume that each agent optimizes a forward-looking intertemporal utility
function, given its own information set. The procedure is identical to that described in the three-agents
case16 .
The intertemporal utility is of the form :
Vi(t) =
X
m0
mi EiUi (t+m)
16See Section 1.2.1
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where i is Agent i
0s discount factor, and Ei his conditional expectation at time t. We give the information
pattern allowing an agent to compute its own expectations. Ui (t+m) is period t+m utility.
Ui (t+m) =  1
2
Xti (t+m)A
(i)
ii Xi (t+m) (5)
 1
2
X
ji
Xtj (t+m  1)A(i)jj Xj (t+m  1)
 
X
ji
Xti (t+m)A
(i)
ij Xj (t+m  1)
 Xti (t+m)Pi (t+m)
+
X
ji
Xtj (t+m  1)A(i)jj ~X(i)j
 
X
j 6i

Xti (t+m)  ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj (t+m  1)
This utility function is,up to some constant irrelevant term, a straightforward generalization of the particular
three-agents model17 . Recall that external and other agentssignals are perceived by Agent i with a one
period delay18 .
2.3 Resolution of the dynamic model
The resolution proceeds in the reverse order of the domination graph, starting from the bottom of the graph
with the optimization for the less strategic agents, and proceeding to the top of the graph.
2.3.1 Optimization problem and form of the solution
At time t; the optimization problem for Agent i is :
@
@Xi(t)
Vi(t) = 0
For every Agent j such that i  j, the optimization has already been performed, so that, Xj (t+m) for
m  1 are functions of Xi(t). We thus obtain :
A
(i)
ii Xi(t) + Ei
X
m1
0@X
ji
mi

Aiij
@Xj (t+m  1)
@Xi(t)
t1AXi (t+m)
+Ei
X
ji
0@A(i)ij Xj (t  1) + X
m1
mi

@Xj (t+m  1)
@Xi(t)
t
A
(i)
jj Xj (t+m  1)
1A
+
X
j 6i
A
(i)
ij Xj(t  1) (6)
= "i(t)
where
"i(t) =  Pi(t) + Ei
X
ji
X
m1
mi

@Xj (t+m  1)
@Xi(t)
t
A
(i)
jj
~X
(i)
j
Since each agent is optimizing an intertemporal utility function depending only on present and future vari-
ables, the model is forward looking. Each structure will react to its forecasts of the future variables, which
17See Equations 2 and explanations below.
18 In (5) we have developed the quadratic terms, to isolate the terms linear in ~X(i)j .
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are built from the signals Xj(t   1); the information at disposal, where j runs over the set of agents. The
solution of the model is found by identication, and the utility being quadratic, the linear solution is of the
form:
Xi(t) = Mi [X(t  1)] +Wi(t)
where [X(t)] is a one-column concatenation of the vectors Xi(t) in an arbitrary chosen order. The coe¢ cients
of matrix Mi are constant, depend on the parameters of the model, and must be identied with the help of
the optimization equations. The size of Mi is determined by those of Xi(t) and [X (t  1)]. The Wi(t) are
constant vectors that depend on the perturbation parameters Pi(t) and the objectives ~X
(i)
j .
For later purpose we need a concatenated form of the previous set of equations :
[X(t)] = M [X(t  1)] + [W (t)] (7)
Its iteration describes the dependency between the variables at time t and t+m:
[X (t+m)] = Mm [X(t)] +
mX
k=1
Mm k [W (t+ k)] (8)
where [W (t)] is the concatenation of theWi(t), and the square matrixM is the concatenation of the matrices
Mi.
We use the postulated solution (8) to compute @Xj(t+m)@Xi(t) for i j in the optimization problem for Agent i.
This yields:
@Xj (t+m)
@Xi(t)
= (Mm)ji (9)
where (Mm)ji is the block ji in the m the power of the concatenated matrix M .
Inserting (9) in (6) we rewrite the optimization problem at time t for the agent i:
A
(i)
ii Xi(t) + Ei
X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij
 
Mm 1

ji
1AXi (t+m)
+Ei
X
ji
0@A(i)ij Xj (t  1) + X
m1
mi
t
 
Mm 1

ji
A
(i)
jj Xj (t+m  1)
1A
+
X
j 6i
A
(i)
ij Xj(t  1)
= "i(t)
which can be rewritten in a more compact form :
A
(i)
ii Xi(t) =  Ei
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij
 
Mm 1

ji
1AXi (t+m)
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t
 
Mm 1

ji
A
(i)
jj Xj (t+m  1)
1A9=;
 
X
j
A
(i)
ij Xj (t  1) + "i(t) (10)
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2.3.2 Pattern of information
The full resolution of the model relies on the expectations EiMm 1 which itself relies on the information set
at the disposal of each agent, i.e. its knowledge of other agents parameters.
To do so, we propose a pattern of information over the domination graph, which describes the way an agent
performs its forecasts.
Each agent knows the domination relations of the subtree he strategically dominates, but ignores the reac-
tivity of the subtrees agents to external, non dominated agents. In other words, Agent i knows the values
of the A(k)k` for i k and i `. The remaining coe¢ cients A
(k)
k` are forecasted to 0 for this agent. Remark
that, as a consequence of our assumptions, the agents do not attribute a probability to the coe¢ cients they
forecast, but rather a xed value.
Moreover, we assume that, at each period t, Agent i knows the signals Xj(t   1) for i  j and for the
Xj(t  1) j 6 i by which he is a¤ected.
From our hypotheses we can infer some results about the agentsforecasts.
First, Agent i, forecasts to 0 the actions of all agents he does not dominate. That is for j 6 i and m  0:
EiXj (t+m) = 0
Consider the optimization equation (10) of Agent j, and compute its expectation by Agent i. Agents i
forecasts of all coe¢ cients in the equation equal 0 which implies EiXj(t) = 0.
In the same way,
EiXj (t+m) = 0 for m  0:
Using Equation (7) the last relation can be translated in an expectation formula about the matrix M :
EiMj = 0 for j 6 i
Moreover, Agent i knowing its own parameters, and its own reaction to perceived signals, one set :
EiMi = Mi
More precise forecasts of the remaining blocks of matrix M will be needed. We set:
(EiM)`;j = 0 for j 6 i and any `
(EiM)`;j = (M)`;j for i j and i `
Having dened the forecasts of the matrix M of parameters by the various agents, we have to complete the
information scheme by xing the forecasts of the random perturbations as well as the goals vectors.
Future shocks are unknown, and random shocks Pi are assumed to be :
EiPj (t+m) = 0 for m  1 and EiPj(t) = 0 for i 6= j and EiPi(t) = Pi(t)
At time t, agent i is only aware of the shock he is a¤ected by, Pi(t).
Agent i is aware of the goals of the agents he is strategically dominating, so that :
Ei ~X
(i)
j =
~X
(i)
j for j  i
and
Ei ~X
(j)
k =
~X
(j)
k for k j  i:
Given this scheme of forecasts and the dynamical equation (8) , we can infer for m  0 that, for i j :
Ei [Xj (t+m)] = Ei

(M)
m+1

j
[X(t  1)]

=

(EiM)
m+1

j
Ei [X(t  1)] ,
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and for j = i :
Ei [Xi (t+m)] =

(EiM)
m+1

i
Ei [X(t  1)]
The information setup and the agentsparameters forecasts being detailed, we can turn to the resolution
of the optimization equations. This is done in the most general way, in the form of an algorithm.
2.3.3 The resolution algorithm
The postulated form of the dynamic (Equation (8)) is:
[X (t+m)] = Mm [X(t)] +
mX
k=1
Mm k [W (t+ k)]
or under the form of its i block line :
Xi (t+m) =
X
j2 
 
(Mm)ij Xj(t) +
mX
k=1
 
Mm k

ij
Wj (t+ k)
!
To identify the matrix M and the vectors W (t+ k), this relation is inserted in Equation (10) for each i.19
Since we have a set of equation, one for each agent, the resolution follows the order of the graph. We proceed
upstream, solving for the less to the most strategical agent.
Rewriting Equation (10) for Agent i, and using the relation
Ei (M
m) = (Ei (M))
m
yields
A
(i)
ii Xi(t) =  
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1AEiXi (t+m)
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj EiXj (t+m  1)
1A9=;
 
X
j
A
(i)
ij Xj(t  1) + "i(t):
Implement the a priori form of the solution :
[X (t+m)] = Mm [X(t)] +
mX
k=1
Mm k [W (t+ k)] for m  0
Given the form of the expectations20 , and the independence of variables Xi(t   1) and Wi(t), the system
leads to two systems of equations dening both Mi and Wi(t).
A
(i)
ii Mi [X(t  1)] =  
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A(EiM)m+1
i
[X(t  1)]
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj ((EiM)
m
)j [X(t  1)]
1A9=; (11)
 
X
j
A
(i)
ij Xj(t  1)
19The expectations in (10) are computed with the rules given in Section 2.3.2.
20See Section 2.3.2.
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A
(i)
ii Wi(t) =  
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1Am+1X
k=1

(EiM)
m+1 k

i
Ei [W (t  1 + k)]
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj
mX
k=1

(EiM)
m k

j
Ei [W (t  1 + k)]
1A9=;
+"i(t): (12)
Since

(EiM)
m 1

ji
is the (ji) block of the concatenated matrix (EiM)
m 1, and M appears in both
Equations (11) and (12), we will rst solve Equation (11) to nd M , then solve Equation (12).
Equation (11) can be written equivalently8<:A(i)ii Mi + X
m1
mi
X
ji
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji

A
(i)
ji

(EiM)
m+1

i
+A
(i)
jj ((EiM)
m
)j
9=; [X (t  1)]
=  
X
j 6=i
A
(i)
ij Xj (t  1)
which leads to the dening relation for Mi:
A
(i)
ii Mi +
X
m1
mi
X
ji
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji

A
(i)
ji

(EiM)
m+1

i
+A
(i)
jj ((EiM)
m
)j

=  
h
A
(i)
i
i
(13)
where
h
A
(i)
i
i
is the concatenation in line of the matrices A(i)ij with 0 in the i-th place.
Since one can always rescale the action variables Xi(t 1) so that the matrix A(i)ii is diagonal with eigenvalues
1;we will, starting from here and without any lack of generality, normalize the A(i)ii to be equal to 1. A null
eigenvalue would correspond, in this case, to a redundant action variable, since it could be expressed as a
function of others. It is therefore excluded.
Equation (13) cannot be solved analytically in a general way. However, it can be solved recursively as series
of i. To do so, write the matrix Mi as a power series of i, that is
Mi =
X
m0
mi M
(m)
i
Inserting this expression in Equation (13) leads directly to the recursive system for the matrices M (m)i :
M
(0)
i =  
h
A
(i)
i
i
M
(k)
i =  
X
ji
kX
m=1

t

(EiM)
m 1

ji

A
(i)
ji

(EiM)
m+1

i
+A
(i)
jj ((EiM)
m
)j

k m
where the bracket [A]k m denoting the k  m-th term in the power expansion in i of any quantity A.
This can be computed for every model given any information pattern. The parameter i being lower than 1,
the matrices M (m)i represent some corrections to the case i = 0; when agents have no interest in the future.
To get an insight of the relevant dynamical mechanisms at stake, it will be su¢ cient to cut the series in i
at some xed order.
Equation (11) being solved for EiM , we turn to Equation (12) to nd the perturbation vector [W (t)].
Recall that we set
"i(t) =  Pi(t) + Ei
X
ji
X
m1
mi
t
 
Mm 1

ji
A
(i)
jj
~X
(i)
j :
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Given the form of the expectations21 , we infer EiPj (t+m) = 0, so that the vector Wi(t) in Equation (12)
depends only on the random perturbation Pi(t) and the constants ~X
(i)
j for j  i. Moreover, since (12) is
linear, its solution is of the form :
Wi(t) =  

A
(i)
ii
 1 
P^i(t) + X^i

(14)
where P^i(t) is proportional to Pi(t), and X^i is a linear function of the ~X
(i)
j with j  k to be identied.
Since we assume the information pattern :
Ei ~X
(i)
j =
~X
(i)
j for j  i:
we have also
EiX^j = X^j for j  i and j = i
.
and
EiWj (t+m) =  

A
(j)
jj
 1
X^j for j  i and j = i for m  0
and nally
Ei [W (t+m)] =
h
W^ (i) (t+m)
i
for m  0
where
h
W^ (i) (t+m)
i
denotes the concatenated vector whose components are:
W^
(i)
i (t) = Wi(t)
and
W^
(i)
j (t+m) =  

A
(j)
jj
 1
X^j
for j  i and 0 otherwise.
Replacing Equation (14) in Equation (12) leads to the following expressions for X^i and P^i(t) :
X^i =
X
`i
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1Am+1X
k=1

(EiM)
m+1 k

i`
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj
mX
k=1

(EiM)
m k

j`
1A9=;A(l)``  1 EiX^`
 
X
ji
X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj Ei
~X
(i)
j (15)
21See Section 2.3.2.
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and
P^i(t) =
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A ((EiM)m)ii
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A9=;A(i)ii  1 P^i(t)
+Pi(t): (16)
The rst equation is a recursive relation which can only be solved in the inverse order of domination of the
graph. The vectors X^i are determined by the vectors EiX^j for j  i. Once the X^j for j  i are computed,
the expectations EiX^j can be calculated, and ultimately the vectors X^i are obtained.
The second equation yields directly P^i(t) as a function of Pi(t). One gets
P^i(t) = (1  Ci) 1 Pi(t)
where the matrix Ci is given by
Ci =
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A ((EiM)m)ii
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A9=;A(i)ii  1 :
which ends the resolution method of the general case. More explicit formulas are impossible at this level of
generality22 . Nevertheless, we provide a short account of the equilibrium and the uctuation around it.
2.3.4 Equilibrium and dynamics around the equilibrium
This section briey presents the long run equilibrium of the system. Start from the dynamic equation :
Xi(t) = Mi [X(t  1)] +Wi(t):
We dene Agent i long run equilibrium Xi by equating Xi(t) = Xi(t  1) = Xi for each i; and canceling all
random perturbations Pi(t).
Concatenating all Xi in the system long run equilibrium

X

, we get
X

= M

X

+

W

likewise,

W

is the vector [W ] where all external perturbations Pi(t) have been set to 0 :
X

= (1 M) 1  W  = X
m0
Mm

W

:
This last expression only exists if 1 M is invertible. Otherwise multiple equilibria or no equilibrium could
arise, a possibility that is neither the generic case, nor has any practical interest here23 .
22The eigenvalues of M relevant to the dynamic evolution of the system, for instance, can only be computed for particular
cases.
23Besides, it does not appear in the three-agent model example presented below.
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To describe the uctuation around

X

, recall that the vectors [W (t)] has Wi(t) =  

A
(i)
ii
 1 
P^i(t) + X^i

for components. Given the dynamic equation :
[X(t)] = M [X(t  1)] + [W (t)]
and the equilibrium relation 
X

= M

X

+

W

;
we dene the uctuations vectors :
[Y (t)] =

X(t)  X
and : h
W^ (t)
i
=

W   W  =   A(i)ii  1 P^i(t)
Finally the relation : 
X(t)  X = M X(t  1)  X+ W (t)  W 
leads to
[Y (t)] = M [Y (t  1)] +
h
W^ (t)
i
:
Assume that the system, in equilibrium at time t = 0 at Y (0) = 0, is perturbed by one single initial shock
W^ (0), i.e. W^ (t) = 0 for t > 0. In this case, one has
[Y (m)] = MmW^ (0) :
and the eigenvalues of M will determine the stability of the system.
Now that we have all the apparatus to solve explicitly any model, analytically in some cases, we will apply
it in for the three-agent model24 .
3 Application of the general model: full resolution of the three-
agent model
This section details the resolution of the three-agent model presented in Section 2.2.2. The equations are
solved in the inverse order of strategic domination, so that we will solve the optimization problem for Agent
B, then for Agent C and ultimately for Agent U. Since solving the model amounts to nding the matrices
Mi and the vectors Wi; we proceed with the following steps.
1. Determination of the matrices Mi
 Solve the optimization problem for Agent B The body has no information about conscious and
the unconscious, so that its expectations about their present and future actions are set to zero. And since it
ignores the inuence of the unconscious on the conscious and reciprocally, equation (11) reduces to
MB =  
h
A
(B)
B
i
= (0; 1; ; 0; 0)
24For more complex situations and numerically dened parameters, this resolution algorithm allows nding solutions through
numerical computations.
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 Solve the optimization problem for Agent C Recall that we have set i =  for all agents.
Thus Equation (11) for MC is
MC =  
h
A
(C)
C
i
 
X
m1
m t

(ECM)
m 1

BC



(ECM)
m+1

C
+  ((ECM)
m
)B

with h
A
(C)
C
i
= (; 0; 0; ; )
and
ECM =
0@ MBB MBC 0MCB MCC MCU
0 0 0
1A
Indeed, under our hypotheses, Agent C is aware of the reaction coe¢ cientMBC of Agent B to its own action,
but does not know the impact of Agent Us action on Agent B. This implies that ECMBC = 0. Similarly
Agent C is neither aware of the impact of its own action over Agent U, nor of the impact of Agent Bs action
over Agent U, so that the last row of blocks is set to 0 in ECM . The upper-right zero is a consequence of
Agent Cs ignorance of Agent Us action over Agent B25 .
To solve Equation (11) for i = C, we postulate the following general form for ECM :
ECM =
0@ MBB MBC 0MCB MCC MCU
0 0 0
1A
=
0BBBB@
(0) (1)
 
0 0 0

(x) (y)
 
0 z u
0@ 00
0
1A 0@ 00
0
1A 0@ 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
1A
1CCCCA
=
0BBBB@
0 1 0 0 0
x y 0 z u
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
where the coe¢ cients x, y, z, u have to be identied. To do so, we diagonalize ECM to determine its powers.
Its eigenvalues are 0 as a triple root, and
1
2
y  1
2
p
y2 + 4x
.
All computations done, this yields for m  1
(ECM)
m
=
1p
y2 + 4x
0BBBB@
 xm 1  m 0  zm 1  um 1
 xm  m+1 0  zm  um
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
with:
m =

1
2
y   1
2
p
y2 + 4x
m
 

1
2
y +
1
2
p
y2 + 4x
m
25For more details see 2.3.2.
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Coming back to (11), we have :
MC =  
h
A
(C)
C
i
 
X
m1
m t

(ECM)
m 1

BC



(ECM)
m+1

C
+  ((ECM)
m
)B

:
The generic term of the sum over m can thus be expressed as :
 
X
m1
m t

(ECM)
m 1

BC



(ECM)
m+1

C
+  ((ECM)
m
)B

= 
X
m0
m
m
y2 + 4x


   xm+2  m+3 0  zm+2  um+2 
+
   xm  m+1 0  zm  um 

Moreover we have :
 
h
A
(C)
C
i
=
    0 0    
By identication, the coe¢ cients of the row MC =
 
x y 0 z u

satisfy the following equations:
x =   + 1
y2 + 4x
0@ x X
m0
m2m   x
X
m0
mm+2m
1A
y =
1
y2 + 4x
0@  X
m0
mmm+3   
X
m0
mm+1m
1A
z =
1
y2 + 4x
0@ z X
m0
m2m   z
X
m0
mm+2m
1A
u =
1
y2 + 4x
0@ u X
m0
m2m   u
X
m0
mm+2m
1A
The sums over  can be explicitly computed using the relations

y2 + 4x
X
m0
m2m = 
1  x
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

;

y2 + 4x
X
m0
mmm+1 = 
2 y
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

;

y2 + 4x
X
m0
mm+2m = 
x (1  x) + y2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

;

y2 + 4x
X
m0
mmm+3 = y
2  x2 + 2x+ y2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

;
and
X
m1
mm 1m+2 = 
X
m0
mmm+3 = 
   a3
1  a2

+
a3 (a+ y)
3
1 + a (a+ y)
+
(a+ y)
3
1   (a+ y)2
!
:
The equations for x and y are then
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x =   + x2   ( + x) (1  x)  y
2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

y = y2
    2x   y2 + x2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

The equation for y implies
y = 0 or 1 = 2
    2x   y2 + x2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

The second solution, y 6= 0 would imply a diverging behavior for x when  ! 0. The model would not be
realistic since, for  ! 0; it would not reproduce the agentsmyopic behavior when  ! 0. We thus keep
the solution y = 0; which leads directly to the following equation for x:
 x   + x32   x2 = 0:
At that point an analytic solution for x is useless, since we always refer to the benchmark case  = 0. We
look for a solution as a series of  and its explicit expression to the third order.
Indeed, the action of Agent U on Agent B, its consequence on Agent C and ultimately on Agent U, needs
three periods to be e¤ective. By identication :
x =   + 2 +O  4 :
The values of the parameters z and u depending x and y can then be computed, and are given by:
z =     z
 

 + x   x   x2
(x + 1)
 
x22   2x + 1
!
and
u =   uz
 

 + x   x   x2
(x + 1)
 
x22   2x + 1
!
:
It leads to the third order to the following series expansion:
z =   +   22 + 3  2 + 22+O  4
u =    + 22   3  2 + 22+O  4
 Solve the optimization problem for Agent U We can turn to the computation of MU and
ultimately M . Since agent U is the most informed agent, EUM = M . For Agent U, Equation (11) is :8<:MU + X
m1
m
X
jU
t
 
Mm 1

jU

A
(U)
ji
 
Mm+1

U
+A
(U)
jj (M
m)j
9=; =   hA(U)U i :
which, using EUM = M , reduces to
MU + 
X
m1
m t
 
Mm 1

U
(Mm)C =  
h
A
(U)
U
i
: (17)
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We seek M as a series expansion to the third order in  and proceed by a recursive computation.
Write M as the matrix
M =
0@ 0 1   0 0x 0 0 z u
MU
1A
Set the power series expansions
M =
X
m0
mMm
and
MU =
X
m0
m (MU)m
Note that Mm is dened by
Mm =
0@  0 1   0 0x y 0 z u

m
(MU)m
1A
where 
0 1   0 0
x y 0 z u

m
denotes the matrix 
0 1   0 0
x y 0 z u

truncated at order 3 in .
As a consequence, Equation (17) leads to the recursive relation:
(MU)m+1 =  
m+1X
k=1
 
t
 
Mk 1

U
 
Mk

C

m+1 k :
Starting with (MU)0 =  
h
A
(U)
U
i
= 0, the above equation yields directly the successive terms (MU)k and
(M)k.
Ultimately, we get
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M =
0BBBB@
0 1   0 0
  0 0   
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
+
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0   
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
+2
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
 0 0  2 2
0 0 0 0 0
0    0 0
0    0 0
1CCCCA
+3
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0    2 + 22 3  2 + 22
3 0 0 2  2
0    0 0
0    0 0
1CCCCA
+O
 
4

with
 =    2 and K = 2 + 2
The computation of the eigenvalues is straightforward. One is equal to 0, as a triple root, and, the two other
ones are complex conjugates
ip

1  1
2
2 (K + ) +
1
2
3
  22 + 2K+O  4 :
2. Determination of the vectors Wi. The vectors Wi are linear combinations of the constant vectors
X^i and the random vectors P^i(t)26 . We will now compute them.
 Computation of the constant part X^i We start with the computation of the X^i which yield the
constant part of the Wi. They are given by equation (15). We have:
X^i =
X
`i
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A ((EiM)m)i`
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj

(EiM)
m 1

j`
1A9=;A(l)``  1 X^`
 
X
ji
X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj
~X
(i)
j :
26See Equations (15) and (16)
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For i = B, there are no agents dominated by Agent B and X^B = 0.
For i = C, since Agent C has a goal for Agent B, i.e. ~X(C)B 6= 0, replacing directly in the previous equation
yields X^C =
   2w0 .
For i = U , it is easy to check that the contribution of X^C in the previous equation is nul at the third order.
As a consequence, since Agent U has a goal ~X(U)C 6= 0 for Agent C, Equation (15) for i = U rewrites:
X^U =
X
m1
m t

(EUM)
m 1

CU
~X
(U)
C
=
X
m1
m t
 
Mm 1

CU
~X
(U)
C :
which at our order, and all calculations done, reduces to
X^U =
0@2
0@ 0 

1A+ 3
0@ 
 
1A1A ~X(U)C +O  4 :
 Computation of the random part P^i(t). Following Equation (16), the random part of P^i(t) is
given by
P^i(t) = (1  Ci) 1 Pi(t)
where Ci is the matrix
Ci =
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A ((EiM)m)ii
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A9=;A(i)ii  1 : (19)
For i = B, no agent is dominated by Agent B and we have CB = 0 and P^B(t) = PB(t).
For i = C, one has
CC =
X
m1

m t

A
(C)
CB

(ECM)
m 1

BC

((ECM)
m
)CC
+
X
m1
mi
t

(ECM)
m 1

BC
A
(C)
BB

(ECM)
m 1

BC
:
Using A(C)CB = , A
(C)
BB =  and the expression for ECM computed previously, Equation (19) reduces to
CC = 
2 +O
 
4

and, we get
P^C(t) = (1  CC) 1 PC(t) =
 
1  2PC(t)
For i = U , EUM = M and, in the same way, Equation (19), leads to
CU =
0@X
m1
m t

(M)
m 1

CU

 
Mm 1

CU
1A
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where
 =  + 
At our order, it is equal to
CU = 
2
0@ 0 0 00 2 
0  2
1A+ 3
0@ 22 0 00  22  2
0  2  22
1A+O  4 :
We nd the vectors Wi(t) by gathering the results for the X^i and Ci, and using Equation (14)
Wi(t) =  

A
(i)
ii
 1 
P^i(t) + X^i

:
Ultimately, we get :
WB(t) =  PB(t)
WC(t) =  
 
1  2PC(t)  2w0 +O  4
WU(t) =  
0@ 33   2
2  3
1A ~X(U)C   (1 + CU)PU(t) +O  3
and
~X
(U)
C =
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


:
The matrix M and the vectors Wi being now known, they are used to determine the equilibrium.
3. Determination the equilibrium

X

The equilibrium is dened by the equation :
X

= M

X

+

W

Its solution is 
X

= (1 M) 1  W 
where

W

=
24 00
X^U
35 =
24 0X^C
X^U
35
The expansion of

W

starting with a term of order 2, we need only to compute (1 M) 1 to the rst
order:
(1 M) 1 =
0BBBB@
1
+1
1
+1   +1   1+1 (  ) 1+1 ( )
  +1 1+1  +1   1+1 (  ) 1+1 ( )
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCA+O  2
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to nd the equilibrium vector to the third order:

X

= 2 ~X
(U)
C
0BBBB@
1
+1 ( )2 + 1+1 (  )2   2 +1
1
+1 ( )2 + 1+1 (  )2 + 2 
2
+1

   
 
1CCCCA+ 1 + 1
0BBBB@
1
1
0
0
0
1CCCCA ~X(C)B +O  4
= 2 ~X
(U)
C
0BBBB@
K
+1    
2+2K
+1
K
+1 + 
22 2K
+1

  (1 )
 (1 )
1CCCCA  
2w0
 + 1
0BBBB@
1
1
0
0
0
1CCCCA+O  4 :
leading directly to the values presented in section 1:
n = 2

K   w0
 + 1
   
2 + 2K
 + 1
  ( ~w   w0) +  1   ~f + w0

w = 2

K   w0
 + 1
+ 
22   2K
 + 1
  ( ~w   w0) +  1   ~f + w0

+ w0
sn = 
3
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


sw =  2 (1 )
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


sf = 
2 (1 )
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


4 Conclusion
This paper developed a dynamic model of interactions between several interacting agents, or structures, and
solved the dynamic version of the three-agent model presented in [GLW] as an example. This model allows
to study the action of a hiddenagent on the stability of a system, and the biases its presence introduces in
an equilibrium. It allows to model apparent irrational behaviors or switches in some agentsgoals, as well as
cyclic behaviors, and is relevant to explain paradoxes such as the independence of irrelevant alternatives,
or sudden changes in goals. In a given situation, external signals may switch on some structures that will
drive the equilibrium toward an unexpected outcome.
A more complete treatment would model the possibility of unstable structures, i.e. structures switching
on and o¤ in the course of time. These apparent switches should be explained by the intrinsic dynamics of
the model.
These results allow to ascribe inconsistent preferences and apparent switches in behaviors to the unknown
action of some strategic structures behind conscious choices. They provide a pattern of the nature of
structures utilities as well as their interactions, and give a hint about internal sub-structures capacity
to plan their actions. The systems cyclicality, the striking di¤erences in dynamic patterns of behaviors
between forward and non-forward looking structures could, through empirical observations, support forward
looking decisions in some hidden partial processes, and give a better understanding of the sequence of mental
processes.Those two points are left for future research.
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